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Abstract: Analysis of the cotton futures price spike and its eects on commercial hedgers
suggest that we do not completely understand the behavior of markets and 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11 Introduction
In late February and early March of 2008, Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) cotton futures
prices were extremely volatile. From February 29 to March 5, nearby futures prices rose the
maximum allowed amount each day. When futures prices were locked limit up, trade in
futures stopped but trade in options on those futures contracts continued. The volume of
trade in options and options price volatility increased dramatically. Because futures prices
hit limits, margin requirements on futures positions, per exchange rules, were based on
synthetic futures prices derived from options values. The price changes from February 29 to
March 5 resulted in unprecedented margin calls for traders who were short futures.
Cotton merchants are a marketing intermediary; they hedge using futures markets in
order to reduce exposure to price risk faced when they purchase physical cotton from growers
and sell this cotton to end-users. The events outlined above led many cotton merchants who
used ICE futures to hedge to nd that reducing price risk comes at a cost; it creates a
liquidity risk because rms may not have available cash or sucient credit to meet margin
calls incurred when futures positions are marked-to-market daily. In March 2008, margin
calls forced some of these liquidity-constrained rms to pay the ultimate price and exit the
industry.
The events of 2008 raise serious questions about the risk management function of futures
markets. This paper seeks to answer these questions by reconciling relevant economic theory
with the actions of cotton merchants during this period. Though no rms have made their
futures trading activity public knowledge, this paper assesses the actions of merchants using
the US Bankruptcy Court records and lings of one bankrupted merchant, Paul Reinhart
Incorporated, the recently released Sta Report on Cotton Futures published by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The Sta Report contains information on
futures and options positions held by groups of traders at a level more disaggregated and
more frequent than in the Commitment of Traders Reports. Additional qualitative data was
gathered from interviews with market participants.
Economists have constructed numerous models to estimate optimal hedge ratios, the
proportion of rm output to be hedged. Comparisons of the optimal decisions from these
models to the actions of real-world rms often indicate that rms make decisions that are
inconsistent with the predictions of theory (e.g. Collins, 1997; Brorsen, 1995). For an analysis
of optimal hedging to be applicable to the case of hedging cotton merchants in March 2008,
it must consider constraints on rm liquidity. This is to say that it must incorporate the
possibility that the rm could exhaust available credit due to margin call risk. One such
recent study is Adam-Muller and Panaretou (2009). The authors analyze the optimal risk
2management and production decisions of liquidity-constrained rms and allow for the use
of futures and options. However, their model considers only a single rm. Others have
considered the liquidity constrained trader in equilibrium and have shown that the presence
of liquidity constrained traders can imply a positive link between the funding illiquidity of
traders and market illiquidity. Thus when traders are credit constrained, they may face high
exit costs because their actions move market prices against them.
Why would markets become more illiquid? Perhaps the market viewed long orders by
hedgers as a signal that fundamentals of supply and demand justied higher prices. Perhaps
liquidity providers wished to squeeze hedgers. Perhaps hedgers were not motivated to pursue
marginal reductions in portfolio variability, but to minimize the probability of bankruptcy
over some reasonable time horizon.
To reconcile theory with evidence, I build a multi-period theoretical model of hedging
rms that captures the salient features of cotton merchants and of cotton markets in periods
of extreme volatility. In the initial period, the model considers merchant rms that have
hedged forward contracts with growers by taking a corresponding short futures position. The
choice variables for this rm are suggested by the CFTC Sta Report (CFTC, 2010) which
noted that when credit was constrained, hedgers had three options: close out positions,
balance short futures positions with synthetic long positions taken in the options market,
or obtain sucient nancing to sustain their short positions. These choices were further
constrained by daily price limits that stopped trade in futures. Note that these options
were not mutually exclusive and that they ignore the possibility that rms had access to
over-the-counter derivatives such as swaps contracts that are not disclosed to the CFTC.
The simplied model presented here ignores trade in options on futures to focus on the
relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity.
2 Case Study
The motivation for the theoretical work in this paper is driven by the events that occurred
in the cotton futures market in March 20081. The facts presented in this section suggest that
the price spike that occurred in the futures market at this time was not driven by supply
and demand fundamentals. It also suggests that commercial hedgers who used the future
market to manage risk were unprepared for and suered negative outcomes due to this price
movement.
1Popular media accounts of these events can be found in Davis, Ann. \In Mystery Cotton-Price Spike,
Traders Hit By Swirling Forces." Wall Street Journal, p. A1, August 13, 2008. and Meyer, Gregory. \Cotton
Price Rally But A Mood of Caution Still Prevails." Financial Times, January 5, 2010.


























Note: Light bars indicate upward price moves, dark bars indicate downward price moves, and vertical lines represent the
trading range for the day.
Source: Commodity Research Bureau
Cotton futures prices began to move higher in late-2007, concurrent with a general com-
modity price boom. Bullish sentiment for cotton prices was partly driven by the view that
high prices for other commodities would draw acres towards these crops and away from
cotton. However, very high inventory levels, both in the US and elsewhere, should have
moderated prices. Stocks-to-use ratios in the US were above 50%, a 25 year high. (USDA
PSD Online) Cash prices in the United States remained far below nearby futures. Basis
levels in Memphis, Tennessee (a futures delivery point), normally in the range of four to six
cents under the nearby futures price, were 25 cents under nearby futures.
A time series of nearby cotton futures prices is shown in Figure 1. At the end of trading
on February 29, 2008, May cotton futures closed near contract highs at 81.86 cents/lb. On
the next trading day, March 3, cotton prices spiked, hitting limit amounts that stopped
trading for the day2. Trade in options on these futures contracts continued and observed
market volatility increased the risk premium priced into options values. On March 4 and
2Limits on daily price movements on ICE cotton futures were three cents above or below the previ-
ous day's closing price when prices were below 84 cents/lb and four cents when above 84 cents/lb. The
CFTC (2010) notes that these limits were tighter as a percent of contract value than for other agricultural
commodities.
45, prices spiked again, with May futures reaching 92.86 cents/lb mid-morning on March 5.
It is believed that the continued increase was driven in part by commercial hedgers buying
futures to unwind the short positions on which they had incurred large losses the previous
day.
Futures trading is highly leveraged because traders post margin typically equal to 5-10%
of the futures contract value. At the end of each trading day, futures positions are marked-
to-market. If prices have moved against the trader, more margin money must be posted.
Unique to this case, the amount of margin money required in ICE cotton was based on
volatility implied by options prices. Continued trade in options after position limits were
hit meant that cotton merchants faced unprecedented margin calls. For example, on March
4, margin calls for traders who were short futures were 12.04 cents/lb, equal to three or
four times daily price limits CFTC (2010). Short traders in the cotton futures market were
required to meet $1 billion in margin calls in a single day (O'Neill, 2010).
Adding to the uncertainty was the elimination of oor trading for cotton futures; March
3, 2008 was the rst day that ICE cotton trading was completely electronic. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that commercial rms were reliant on information relayed by oor traders
and this was lost with the move to full electronic trading. After the spike, futures prices fell
quickly to approximately 70 cents/lb. Subsequently, futures prices declined further, falling
below 40 cents/lb in early November 2008.
In response to these events, the CFTC, the regulatory agency responsible for futures
market oversight, conducted an investigation to determine if futures market were deliberately
manipulated. This investigation studied the futures and options market positions taken
by commercial and speculative traders. It found that the largest net long traders, whose
positions were mostly speculative and who stood to gain the most from an upward price move,
were \inactive" during critical periods of price movement in late February and early March
2008. Net short commercial hedgers, namely cotton merchants, were the most active, along
with traders who held small positions and traders whose trading patterns were indicative of
scalping. This evidence suggests that an economic theory that explains the price spike event
should be driven by the actions of net short commercial hedgers.
The price spike had signicant, negative, and unexpected consequences for cotton mer-
chants. Losses due to margin calls on futures positions caused substantial nancial losses and
forced a number of rms to exit the industry. In particular, a group of merchants who were
family-owned and dealt almost exclusively in cotton either sought to be acquired, wound up
operations, or declared bankruptcy. The largest of these rms were Dunavant, Paul Rein-
hart, and Weil Brothers. All of these rms were among the largest cotton handlers in the
United States and all had signicant operations worldwide (Meyer, 2010).
5Firms in the cotton business are generally closely held and little is known about the
specics of their operation. However, the availability of publicly available bankruptcy pro-
ceedings for one exiting rm, Paul Reinhart Inc., the US subsidiary of Swiss rm Paul
Reinhart AG, provide unique insight. Reinhart led for bankruptcy protection on October
15, 2008. Like other merchants, Reinhart entered into forward contracts with growers in
late 2007 and early 2008, hedging those purchases by selling futures. The run up in futures
prices meant that Reinhart was faced with about $100 million in margin calls. (The rm
had annual revenues of approximately $640 million in the scal year prior to the spike.) On
March 4, Reinhart closed their futures positions and entered into \various options trades" to
try to maintain hedges in an eort to reduce margin risk and free up liquidity. But Reinhart
incurred further losses on these trades, causing it to default on its loans. Reinhart signed
an agreement with its lenders that would allow it to reestablish its hedges for the forward
contracts it still held with growers. In this agreement, the lenders gained the right to sweep
cash from Reinharts accounts when account balances were above given thresholds and the
right to veto the sale of Reinhart to third parties.
Reinhart began to seek bids for its operations. In July 2008, it obtained a bid from
Allenberg Cotton that would ensure performance on its existing forward contracts, but the
lenders vetoed this bid. In the meantime, cotton prices fell and Reinhart made signicant
gains on the short futures positions it established following its restructured lending arrange-
ment. Reinhart states in led bankruptcy papers that its lenders swept $180 million of these
gains from its brokerage accounts. After being forced by its lenders to liquidate most of its
futures positions in early October 2008, Reinhart led for bankruptcy.
The Reinhart bankruptcy case provides evidence of how credit constraints can play out
for real-world rms. Often economists think of nancial constraints as hard limits that bind
the operations of a rm. In the case of Reinhart, the rm was enabled by its creditors to
nominally continue operations, but its existence was as a ward of its lenders. The case also
raises a number of interesting questions: Why did prices move so high, so quickly? Why
did some rms have the liquidity to survive unprecedented margin calls when others did
not? How does information ow in and out of markets and how does this aect the decision
making of traders? The literature review and model sections below begin to address these
questions.
3 Literature Review
In an eort to understand the dramatic eects of limited credit availability as played out
in the case above, theoretical models of hedging behavior have incorporated agents who face
6liquidity constraints while using futures to hedge. One class of model considers the actions
of a single rm facing price and liquidity risk. In the absence of liquidity risk, simple models
of the risk-averse hedging rm (e.g. Holthausen, 1979) suggest that it is optimal for the rm
to fully hedge, that is to take a position in the futures market that fully osets its cash
market position. There has been considerable eort in the economics literature to explain
why the optimizing rm might not fully hedge; explanations related to the funding liquidity
of the rm are part of this literature. The basic result of these papers is this: the presence
of liquidity risk implies lower hedge ratios.
3.1 Firm-level Optimization
A recent paper by Adam-Muller and Panaretou (2009) is characteristic of this literature
and describes with relative acuity the problem facing short hedgers observed in the cotton
futures market. It is constructive to consider the detailed optimization problem presented in
this paper in order to develop a more generalized model later. Adam-Muller and Panaretou
(2009) consider a two-period model of the rm making production decisions and futures and
options trading decisions. The rm maximizes its utility over expected nal-period wealth
in each period, responding to futures price movements that follow an exogenously specied
random walk. There is a terminal period following the rm's nal trading decision in which
the cash and futures positions are closed and nal wealth is realized. Unlike many previous
studies that represent the liquidity constraint as an inability to meet cash ow obligations
beyond a given threshold (e.g. Lien, 2003), the rm must cover cash ow shortfalls (due to
margin calls on futures positions, for example) by borrowing at an exogenously determined
rate above the risk-free rate.
The main result of the single-rm optimization problem considered by Adam-Muller and
Panaretou (2009) plays out over each of the two periods. Initially, the rm will less than fully
hedge to reduce its exposure to liquidity risk, that is the risk of a margin call on its position
prior to futures expiry. If the market moves against the hedging rm after the rst trading
period, the rm must reduce its futures position further. These results are important in
understanding the potential actions of individual agents, but by construction cannot explain
market-level phenomena such the dramatic price movements and exit of some rms observed
during the cotton futures price spike in 2008. The case study above suggests that it was not
action, but the interaction of rms in the market that lead to the liquidity shortfall event.
73.2 A Market in Equilibrium
An equilibrium model of futures trading is necessary to explain market-level phenomena.
The nancial economics literature contains a number of works that consider rm liquidity in
the context of dramatic market events. Three major economic events, the \Black Monday"
crash of 1987, the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the recent
nancial crisis induced by the \subprime" mortgage collapse, seem to have inspired this
work. This work points to a more complicated type of liquidity risk. Whereas the single-
rm model above considered liquidity risk as an increased cost of borrowing, these papers
suggest that when markets are volatile enough to make access to credit an issue, liquidity
risk is more complicated. The liquidity risk faced by rms is related not only to borrowing
costs but to the threat that when unmet margin calls forces the closing of futures positions,
the rms will face illiquid markets. The rms cannot close their positions without incurring
further losses as market prices move against them.
Liquidity events create a positive feedback cycle between liquidity and loss events for
rms who face liquidity risk in the markets where they manage price risk. Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) present a visualization of this process as what they call a \liquidity-loss
cycle." This cycle is presented in Figure 2, adapted to reect the cotton futures market story.
The cycle indicates how market conditions are fragile; one event can trigger a sequence of
negative outcomes that feedback into further negative outcomes. While Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) is the most recent work to examine the phenomenon of funding liquidity
and market liquidity, previous work that considered liquidity constrained traders such as
Chowdhry and Nanda (1998) and Liu and Longsta (2004) explore similar circumstances in
which funding liquidity implies some degree of market \fragility".
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) develop a theoretical multi-period model of asset
trading that generates this fragility in market prices and funding conditions. This model is
based on a model of market liquidity developed in response to the 1987 stock market crash
by Grossman and Miller (1988). The model considers three types of agents familiar also
in the cotton case: customers, speculators, and nanciers. Financiers provide credit to the
speculators, who act as market makers or liquidity providers to customers who wish to trade
risky assets. In the models of Grossman and Miller (1988) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), it is speculators who face liquidity constraints. Asset price fundamentals follow an
exogenously specied time-series process. Each type of agent solves its own optimization
problem at each period.
There are two important measures in the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
First, the funding liquidity of speculators is dened by the shadow cost of capital. If the
liquidity constraint binds, that is speculators have enough liquidity to meet the margin
8Figure 2: Visualization of the \liquidity-loss spiral"
Source: Adapted from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
requirements on the asset positions they nd to be optimal, then the shadow cost of capital
is positive. Note that margin requirements in this case refer to the capital requirements that
nanciers place upon borrowers. Second, market liquidity is measured as the absolute value
of the deviation of market prices from their fundamental value. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) shows analytically that these two measures are linked. This is due to the fact that
speculators who are well informed about the fundamental value of an asset see deviations
from fundamentals as an opportunity for prot when prices and fundamentals eventually
converge.
The nature of the link between market liquidity and funding liquidity is the key result
from the paper of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The way in which margins are set
drives this result. When nanciers know the fundamental value of the asset and know that
market prices and fundamentals must converge in the terminal period, margins can be set in
a manner that promotes trades to bring prices in line with fundamentals. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) refer to this case as one of stabilizing margins. When margins are set without
knowledge of fundamental values, their model shows that margins can be destabilizing.
Financiers could set margins assuming that price volatility is indicative of fundamental
volatility. Since funding liquidity risk for traders is higher when volatile is greater, illiquid
9markets (where price moves away from its fundamental value) could result in higher margin
requirements. This produces the positive feedback displayed in the liquidity-loss spiral seen
above. Thus, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that funding liquidity constraints can
make markets fragile. Small changes in fundamentals can lead to large jumps in illiquidity
in both markets and funding conditions.
The theoretical literature that generates these results can be useful in developing a model
to explain why prices moved so dramatically in the cotton futures market in 2008 and why
rms were forced to exit as a result. However, in attempting to adapt these models to the
case of liquidity constrained hedgers, a number of complications arise. Unlike the models
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) it is not speculators or market liquidity providers
who are funding constrained. If the funding constrained traders are short hedgers, then a
loss-inducing price move in the futures market is one where prices move above fundamental
values. It is dicult to generate such a move theoretically. Speculators who know the
fundamental value of the asset and who know that convergence must occur in the terminal
period are unlikely to allow this. Moreover, if any level of risk aversion is posited for hedgers,
the implied risk premium in futures prices means that prevailing prices should be lower than
fundamentals.
4 A Simple Model
I propose a simple model of hedging behavior that demonstrates how funding constraints
might make markets illiquid and drive prices to exceed fundamentals. This simple model is
an adaption of ideas presented in Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Pedersen (2009). One way
of generating price spikes and liquidity spirals is to model these events as a \running for the
exit" phenomenon. The economic study of this phenomenon owes a great deal to the seminal
paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that modelled runs on banks and showed that banks
with long maturity assets and short maturity liabilities may be unstable. Similar ideas can
describe runs in asset markets. My model considers the case of futures hedgers explicitly,
where rms hold longer term physical positions and face liquidity risk due to margin calls
in the short term.
Suppose there are two hedgers, A and B, holding short futures positions, xA = xB
corresponding to osetting positions in the physical market. Short futures positions are
represented by negative values such that the combined initial position is x0 = xA + xB  0.
The rms are identical except that they vary in their ability to nance margin calls. Since
hedgers in this case are net short, someone else must be net long. Suppose that the long
side of the futures positions xA and xB are held by a sector of market makers or liquidity
10providers. Following Bernardo and Welch (2004), this group is comprised of all traders willing
to trade with hedgers on demand without fear of liquidity shocks. Suppose this group gives
rise to an aggregate \supply of futures positions" function with a slope of one. That is, if
a hedgers wishes to buy one contract, the price must rise one unit and if a hedger wishes
to sell one contract the price must fall one unit. The inherent assumption is that liquidity
provision is undertaken by risk averse agents and cannot be expanded, which is why buying
or selling pressure causes prices to rise or fall.
Hedgers may trade in each of two periods, t = 1 and t = 2. In each period, the orders
for trades placed by hedgers are executed. As in Bernardo and Welch (2004), we assume
that execution order is not sequential. No trader can gain an advantage by \front-running"
their orders and no trader is discouraged from trading because they expect to be placed in
the rear of the selling order. Instead, all traders receive the average execution price of all
orders submitted in that time period. Bernardo and Welch (2004) note that the assumption
that markets lack perfectly sequential execution may be realistic in the case when markets
are closed, as in the cotton case when the market was locked limit up. This explanation is
helpful, although this assumption is made for tractability as much as to reect reality.
Since the rms are fully hedged, in the absence of exogenous shocks they do not trade.
Suppose instead that the rms face an exogenous shock to futures market prices in the initial
period, t = 0 and the shock is positive so that the prevailing price after the shock, p0 is above
the price at which the rms acquired their positions in the futures market. Suppose too that
this implies a margin call that exhausts the available credit of A, but not B.
Consider two possible scenarios. In the rst scenario, B does not know about A's distress
and so has no reason to trade at t = 1. A liquidates his position and the futures market
price moves along the supply of futures positions curve to p1. The average execution price
price for the trades of A is the midpoint between p1 and p0, or (p1   p0)=2. Obviously, A is
worse o, because he has taken a loss on his futures trades and is unhedged. However, B is
also adversely aected, taking a mark-to-market loss of p1   p0 on her short position. With
A out of the market, B has no incentive to trade in period 2.
In the second scenario, B knows that A is distressed after period 0. B can act on this
information to make herself better o than in the rst scenario. B takes A's distress as a
signal about how market prices must move in the coming trading period, t = 1. Knowing
A must exit, B buys back her short futures position in period 1; both hedgers fully exit the
futures market at t = 1 so that their combined position is x1 = 0. This moves the market
price to p
1. Since neither hedger has any advantage in having their order lled, the average
execution price for both A and B is again the midpoint between p0 and p
1. In this simple
two-trader case with equal starting positions, the midpoint is p1, the prevailing price in the
11rst scenario. After A has exited, B can reestablish her hedge in period 2 at an average
execution price, p
2, that is the midpoint between p1 and p
1. Having bought at a price below
what she later sold at, B is better o by an amount equal to (p
2   p1)xB. B is again fully
hedged in anticipation of future shocks.
A visual representation of each scenario is presented in Figures 3 and 4. The buy and sell
orders placed by A and B can be represented as movements along the supply of speculation
curve, the upward sloping line in each panel. The left panel shows the price change from p0
to p1 that results from A's exit. The corresponding net short futures position of all hedgers
moves from x0 to x1 = xB. The right panel shows the rst period move from p0 to p
1 and
the second period move back to p
2 = p1.
Figure 3: Equilibrium in Scenario 1 Figure 4: Equilibrium in Scenario 2
This model demonstrates how the funding illiquidity of one trader can lead to market
illiquidity. When the distressed hedger is forced to exit, he nds that he receives poor order
execution because other traders are running for the exit. The market is illiquid when liquidity
is needed most, because the ability of market makers to provide liquidity is xed and the
run for the exit creates greater demand for market liquidity.
The outcome of the second scenario demonstrates in a very simple way how the liquidity
spiral described earlier may begin. If a third hedger, C, is added to this model, one can see
how the spiral might be sustained. If the funding liquidity constraint of C is less restrictive
than that of B and if both hedgers run for the exit, B may face a liquidity event and be
forced to exit the futures market. Note
In general terms, the story told by this simple model is consistent with the cotton case
in three important ways. First, the time-series of market prices generated by this model
is broadly consistent with the price spike observed in the cotton market. Prices moved up
12rapidly, declined as just as quickly, then leveled o above the level where they began the
run. Second, the model does not rely on the actions of speculators to move prices. As
the CFTC noted, traders with large long speculative positions were not making trades that
moved market prices; it was the actions of short hedgers that was concurrent with large price
moves. Third, it allows, albeit only by construction, for some hedgers to be forced to exit
while others are not. It can be postulated that in the cotton case, the major reason some
rms survived was their ability to access liquidity quickly. For multi-commodity merchant
rms such Allenberg (Louis Dreyfus) and Cargill, cotton is a small part of their business.
Such multi-commodity rms may be able to \self-insure" against margin call risk when
smaller merchants cannot.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The model presented in this paper is a rst step towards reconciling theoretical modeling
of hedger behavior with real world events like those that occurred during the cotton futures
price spike in 2008. However, the simple model of trading and exit poses a number of
questions that should be addressed in future research. Whereas the simple model considered
mechanistically the ability of one trader to react to the action of others, a complete model
would consider the optimization problem of all agents, as was the case in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009). Considering the results and omissions from the simple model can inform
the construction of a more complete model.
Further analysis should consider the following questions. Most importantly, what moti-
vates commercial rms to hedge and what motivates speculators to provide liquidity? Hedger
risk aversion is a common assumption. In the model presented above, risk aversion and the
provision of a risk premium in futures prices also motivate speculators to take the opposite
side of the trades desired by commercial hedgers. There is considerable debate in the liter-
ature about the presence of a risk premium and assuming its existence should not be done
without good reason. Assuming that traders are risk neutral and still unconstrained in size
of the positions they may take on is also problematic. The model must contain some mech-
anism by which price movements occur and it is very dicult to generate price movement
when liquidity provision is unlimited at a price equal to the speculators long-run expected
price level.
This paper does not explicitly address the relationship between supply and demand fun-
damentals in the cash market and the futures market price. Clearly in the case of cotton,
prices during the spike exceeded fundamentally justied levels. But how can a model with
rational, prot maximizing speculators generate prices that exceed fundamentals? Specula-
13tors would not enter into trades with negative expected prots, unless their expectations are
subject to error in some way. It could be the case that speculators do have less information
about fundamental prices and acting upon awed information can cause temporary devia-
tions from fundamentals. It might also be the case that speculators do not act uniformly, so
that some subset of speculators are willing to trade no matter what the prevailing price.
One more matter that must be resolved is the motivation for lenders to force the exit of
hedging rms from the future market. Losses incurred by rms because they could not ride
out the spike implied potential losses for lenders if rms could not repay their existing loans.
Even though the cash market prices did not move in concert with futures, major hedging
rm should have been able to engage in arbitrage using the physical cotton that they held,
so long as they did not close their short futures positions. The lenders could have enabled
this arbitrage or done it themselves, but something stopped this from happening. There is
a literature in nance on the limits to arbitrage that may help explain what happened.
Finally, a complete model would describe the mechanism that ends the spike or stops the
run in prices. In the model in this paper, the run stops because there is only one hedging
rm left in the market. Clearly, requiring the exit of all the rms save one is an unrealistic
assumption. This is where a more complete denition and proof of the existence of market
equilibrium is necessary.
Answers to these questions will have important public policy implications. The com-
modity price boom and bust, including events in the cotton market, have spurred calls for
derivatives regulation, including calls for controls on price movement and trader positions.
Additional work can enable analysis of such policies that is robust to the types of events
observed during the commodity price spike.
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